Anti-Representationalism, Naturalism, and Placement Metaphysics

A perennial issue in contemporary philosophy is the question of how, in Wilfrid Sellars' terms, categories of the 'manifest image' relate to those of the 'scientific image'. A widespread kind of naturalism assumes that the categories of science have a certain kind of ontological priority and that other categories (meaning, mind, morality and so on) have to be somehow placed or located in the world of science to be fully vindicated. Huw Price has argued in several papers that if one gives up a view of how language functions he calls 'representationalism' then this way of understanding placement problems-object naturalism-necessarily lapses. Price argues that in foregoing representationalism and embracing semantic deflationism we should remain naturalists, but subject naturalists, seeking to understand the function our different discourses play in our lives as natural beings: the project of global expressivism. This argument has recently been challenged by several authors who argue that object naturalism can coherently and rationally be pursued within a semantic deflationist framework. I will argue that these objections to Price's view are all ultimately unconvincing given a wide enough purview of the dialectic. The viability and coherence of global expressivism itself, and whether it is the only possible form of subject naturalism, are briefly addressed in conclusion.