Auction design by an informed seller: A foundation of reserve price signalling

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhao, Xin [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Int Trade & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源：
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 2023年 / 56卷 / 03期
关键词：
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP; INSURANCE MARKETS; MECHANISM DESIGN; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I：
10.1111/caje.12676
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies mechanism design by a seller privately informed of the (continuous) quality of an indivisible object. An important solution to this informed-principal problem, the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson mechanisms, which correspond to the least-cost separating allocations in the signalling literature, is characterized. The characterization reveals that reserve prices are the least costly device to separate sellers of different qualities: In the RSW mechanisms, the lowest-quality seller adopts her public-information optimal selling procedure, and each higher-quality seller adopts a selling procedure that differs from her public-information optimal one only in that the reserve prices are higher. This finding provides a mechanism-design foundation for reserve-price signalling studied in the literature.
引用
收藏
页码：1161 / 1190
页数：30
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