Governmental inspection and firm environmental protection expenditure: Evidence from China

被引:24
|
作者
Qian, Xuesong [1 ,3 ]
Ding, Hai [1 ]
Ding, Zifang [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[2] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Marxism, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Ctr Innovat & Dev, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[4] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Marxism, 1037 Luoyu Rd, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Central inspections; Environmental protection expenditure; Quasi-natural experiment; Environmental regulation; INDUSTRIAL-ACTIVITY; PRODUCTIVITY; POLLUTION; REGULATIONS; INNOVATION; AIR;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106284
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There has been much debate about whether firms will allocate capital for environmental protection, which highlights the importance of promoting and motivating firms to invest in the environment. Using China's central inspection of firms' environmental protection as a natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference -in-differences method to investigate how these government inspections affect firms' environmental investments. Empirical results show that firm environmental investment is significantly higher in inspected regions than in uninspected ones. By strengthening law enforcement, government inspections can have a significant impact on firms' environmental decision-making processes. As firms improve their environmental behaviour, central in-spections promote reductions in pollutant emissions, which facilitates greener and cleaner production methods. However, the higher compliance costs for businesses under these tighter regulations squeeze corporate activity and margins. This paper reveals the micro-mechanisms behind the real effects of government inspections on firms' environmental investments, providing timely implications for regulators concerned with environmental protection.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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