(Im)politeness as object, (im)politeness as perspective

The first-second order distinction has dominated theoretical discussions about (im)politeness for the past two decades. However, while there has been a lot of emphasis placed on different perspectives on (im)politeness in the field, what constitutes our object of understanding(s) arguably remains somewhat more elusive. In this paper, I suggest that one of the reasons for this is that we have inadvertently conflated (im)politeness-as-perspective (an epistemological issue) with (im)politeness-as-object (an ontological issue), and have largely ignored the latter in ongoing debates about the first-second order distinction. Building on observations about mundane interactions between co-participants who behave in ways we might not typically associate with politeness, I first propose that (im)politeness-as-object encompasses a complex, multi-layered set of first, second and third order evaluations that are reflexively interrelated but nevertheless ontologically distinct. I then suggest that the inherent complexity of (im)politeness-as-object calls for a more nuanced account of (im)politeness-as-perspective in which researchers necessarily draw on different first-order (commonsense, emic, user, folk theoretic) and second-order (academic, etic, observer, scientific theoretic) understandings to varying degrees. I conclude that the multidimensional, prismatic model of (im)politeness that emerges reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of (im)politeness itself.