Bi-Objective Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing With Budget/Cost Constraint

被引:7
|
作者
Zhou, Yuanhang [1 ]
Tong, Fei [1 ,2 ]
He, Shibo [3 ]
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Cyber Sci & Engn, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangsu Prov Engn Res Ctr Secur Ubiquitous Network, Purple Mt Labs, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ, Dept Control Sci & Engn, Hangzhou 310027, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Costs; Optimization; Crowdsensing; Task analysis; Linear programming; Sensors; Mobile computing; Mobile crowdsensing; incentive mechanism; bi-objective optimization; reverse auction; QUALITY; DESIGN; ALGORITHM; TASKS;
D O I
10.1109/TMC.2022.3229470
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In recent years, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been widely adopted as an efficient method for large-scale data collection. In MCS systems, insufficient participation and unstable data quality have become two crucial issues that prevent crowdsensing from further development. Thus designing a valid incentive mechanism is essentially significant. Most of the existing works on incentive mechanism design focus on single-objective optimization with various constraints. However, in the real-world crowdsensing, it is common that several objectives to be optimized exist. Furthermore, constraints on budget or cost are often seen in MCS systems as the feasibility of implementing incentive mechanism is indispensable. This paper studies a bi-objective optimization scenario of MCS to simultaneously optimize total value function and coverage function with budget/cost constraint through a set of problem transformations. Then a budget- or cost-feasible bi-objective incentive mechanism is further proposed to solve the aforementioned bi-objective optimization problem through the combination of binary search and greedy heuristic solution under budget or cost constraint, respectively. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, the obtained results demonstrate that the mechanisms achieve computation efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and budget or cost feasibility, while one mechanism obtains an approximation.
引用
收藏
页码:223 / 237
页数:15
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