Founder versus agent CEOs: Effects of founder status and power on firm innovation and cost of capital

被引：5
|
作者：
Kannan-Narasimhan, Rangapriya [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Wang, Ruixiang [5 ]
Zhu, Pengcheng [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ San Diego, Knauss Sch Business, San Diego, CA USA
[2] San Jose State Univ, Lucas Coll, San Jose, CA USA
[3] San Jose State Univ, Grad Sch Business, San Jose, CA USA
[4] Univ Exeter, Business Sch, Exeter, England
[5] Clark Univ, Sch Management, Worcester, MA 01610 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2023年 / 167卷
关键词：
Founder CEO; Agent CEO; Innovation performance; CEO power; Cost of capital; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP; TECHNOLOGICAL-INNOVATION; MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; MARKET; DIRECTORS; FAMILY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114180
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
How does CEO founding status combined with CEO power jointly influence organizational outcomes? While several studies have separately explored the role of founding status on firm performance, as well as the role of CEO power on organizational outcomes, few have addressed how founding status combined with CEO power might jointly influence both positive and negative organizational outcomes. Based on a sample of 3055 firm-year observations from 501 publicly traded high-tech managed by 777 CEOs over the sample period of 15 years (1996 to 2010), we find that powerful founder CEOs enhance an organization's innovation performance. However, having a powerful founder CEO is also likely to raise the firm's cost of capital, resulting in lower investment returns and detrimental consequences for firm performance. Our findings have several theoretical and practical implications for understanding the impact of CEO status and power on a firm's innovation and stock performance.
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页数：14
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