Do firms with specialized M&A staff make better acquisitions?

被引:7
|
作者
Gokkaya, Sinan [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Xi [3 ]
Stulz, Rene M. [2 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Ohio Univ, Coll Business, Athens, OH 45701 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] Miami Univ, Farmer Sch Business, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[5] European Corp Governance Inst, Brussels 1000, Belgium
关键词
Mergers and acquisitions; Acquisitions; Corporate takeover market; Corporate development; M& A staff; FREE CASH FLOW; AGENCY PROBLEMS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES; FINANCIAL ADVISERS; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; INVESTMENT BANKER; MERGERS; PERFORMANCE; TARGET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We open the black box of the M&A decision process by examining whether specialized M&A staff, who perform a wide range of acquisition-related functions, improve acquisi-tion performance. We find that the presence and the quality of specialized M&A staff is one of the most economically important determinants of acquisition performance. We ex-plore mechanisms through which specialized M&A staff improve acquisition performance and investigate why only less than half of US firms employ such staff. Agency costs are a first-order determinant for specialized M&A staff's value-creation role. Such staff do not improve acquisition performance in firms with heightened agency conflicts.(c) 2022 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
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页码:75 / 105
页数:31
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