Mergers and acquisitions;
Acquisitions;
Corporate takeover market;
Corporate development;
M&
A staff;
FREE CASH FLOW;
AGENCY PROBLEMS;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES;
FINANCIAL ADVISERS;
CEO OVERCONFIDENCE;
INVESTMENT BANKER;
MERGERS;
PERFORMANCE;
TARGET;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We open the black box of the M&A decision process by examining whether specialized M&A staff, who perform a wide range of acquisition-related functions, improve acquisi-tion performance. We find that the presence and the quality of specialized M&A staff is one of the most economically important determinants of acquisition performance. We ex-plore mechanisms through which specialized M&A staff improve acquisition performance and investigate why only less than half of US firms employ such staff. Agency costs are a first-order determinant for specialized M&A staff's value-creation role. Such staff do not improve acquisition performance in firms with heightened agency conflicts.(c) 2022 Published by Elsevier B.V.
机构:
City Univ London, Bayes Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, EnglandCity Univ London, Bayes Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, England
Bilinski, Pawel
Yim, Andrew
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机构:
City Univ London, Bayes Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, EnglandCity Univ London, Bayes Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, England