Evolutionary game analysis of forestry carbon sink trading model under blockchain technology

被引:2
|
作者
Song, Yukun [1 ]
Wu, Haiquan [2 ]
机构
[1] Northeast Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Harbin 150040, Peoples R China
[2] Cent South Univ, Sch Publ Adm, Changsha 410083, Peoples R China
关键词
Blockchain technology; Forest carbon sink; Evolutionary game; Transaction mode;
D O I
10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e22706
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
As a new balanced economy, the green economy guides the upgrade and transformation of industrial structures based on the original concept of sustainable development. Reducing carbon emissions is indispensable for achieving better and faster green economic development. From a functional perspective, forestry carbon sinks have good carbon sequestration potential and have positive attributes, such as climate regulation and biodiversity maintenance, for the entire ecosystem. To promote the continuous development of forestry carbon sink trading in China, blockchain, a new technology with several advantages such as traceability, supervision, and tamper-proofness, has emerged, which creates a good market trading environment and has made a breakthrough in the trading mode. If forestry carbon sink trading is effectively supported, organic combinations and simultaneous synergistic development can be conducted, which will open new avenues for the carbon sink economy. In this study, a game model of the forest carbon sink trading mode under blockchain technology was constructed from the perspective of traders, and influential factors, such as the carbon sink available for sale by the supply side and the demand side's perspective towards emission reduction, were considered. Subsequently, the MATLAB R2020b software was used to conduct a simulation analysis of the transactions, thereby showing the evolutionary path of the game between the two sides and the influence mechanism of the addition of blockchain technology on the evolution trajectory of the demand-side decision. The findings indicate that, from the perspective of participating traders, the inclusion of blockchain technology in forestry carbon sink trading resulted in positive effects. Moreover, the greater the probability that the carbon sinks available for sale in the market can meet the demand, the more likely the demand side is to participate in the transaction.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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