The cordon sanitaire: a social norm-based model

This paper is on cordons sanitaires - coordinated refusals to collaborate with a given political party on principle - and the behaviours associated with it. I argue that, once established, the cordon is properly classified and analysed as a social meta-norm, rather than a mere strategy (the common classification in the literature). First, I examine the merits of a mere strategy model, and conclude that a cordon may well be instituted for strategic reasons, but that aspects of party behaviour are not well accounted for within this model. Second, I show that once established, the cordon is best classified as a social norm, and I discuss the empirical and theoretical implications of this. Finally, I illustrate these theoretical points, through the example of the isolated Sweden Democrats (SD) at the local level. Conceptualizing the cordon sanitaire as a social norm, rather than as a strategy gives new insights into the conditions under which it is complied with, violated, and enforced through sanctions. It also provides an explanation for previously puzzling outcomes, such as the failure of mainstream parties to abandon the cordon once it proves ineffective in limiting the challenger's growth and influence.