Family succession;
Cost of bank loans;
Loan contract terms;
Top -tier auditor;
INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESS;
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH;
CONTRACTING EVIDENCE;
AUDITOR CHOICE;
AGENCY COSTS;
OWNERSHIP;
FIRM;
DIVERSIFICATION;
BUSINESS;
DETERMINANTS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.iref.2023.10.019
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the effect of family succession on the cost of bank loans and non-price contractual terms. We use a unique dataset from China and find that lending banks are likely to charge higher interest rates and offer tighter contractual terms, such as loan maturity and collateral requirements, for family succession firms. These findings indicate that information asymmetry and default risks may arise after subsequent family successions. We also find that family succession firms can lower the cost of bank loans by hiring top-tier auditors, who can enhance financial reporting credibility. This finding suggests that professional, high-quality auditors can provide extremely valuable services to family succession firms.
机构:
Univ Texas Rio Grande Valley, Robert C Vackar Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, Brownsville, TX 78520 USAUniv Texas Rio Grande Valley, Robert C Vackar Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, Brownsville, TX 78520 USA
Javadi, Siamak
Masum, Abdullah-Al
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Wisconsin, Coll Business, Dept Finance & Business Law, Oshkosh, WI 54901 USAUniv Texas Rio Grande Valley, Robert C Vackar Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, Brownsville, TX 78520 USA