A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Chinese-Style Education Investment in ASEAN Under Local Government Policy

被引:0
|
作者
Zhu, Zheqi [1 ]
Zhai, Kun [1 ]
机构
[1] Peking Univ, Beijing, Peoples R China
关键词
Evolutionary Game; Government Regulation; Investment Decision; OCE; FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.4018/IJGCMS.336839
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
With the deepening of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), many Chinese have been dispatched to Southeast Asian countries to participate in technical support and management. However, there are no OCE schools locally that can provide educational resources for their children. The decision of whether to invest in overseas Chinese-OCE has become a challenge for Chinese education groups. In this paper, the authors put forward an evolutionary game analysis scheme to study the OCE investment decisions among host country governments, students, and Chinese enterprises. The simulation results show that (1) the government's subsidy is always helpful to Chinese enterprise, especially at the beginning stage, (2) applying a soft strength of positive execution and combining with other methods could encourage the enterprise at the beginning and regulate the market later on, and (3) high strength of high support of government for the educational infrastructure is a win -win method for both students and the enterprise. Some managerial insights and suggestions are proposed based on these results.
引用
收藏
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China
    Su, Nina
    Shi, Zhuqin
    Zhu, Xianqi
    Xin, Yunsheng
    SAGE OPEN, 2021, 11 (01):
  • [42] What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model
    Liu, Yajie
    Dong, Feng
    Energy, 2022, 238
  • [43] What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model
    Liu, Yajie
    Dong, Feng
    ENERGY, 2022, 238
  • [44] Technological cooperation relationships among supply chain enterprises under the perspective of technological blockade: A tripartite evolutionary game model
    Qi, Ning
    Zhang, Ao
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2024, 447
  • [45] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy
    Yu, Na
    Chen, Jianghua
    Cheng, Lei
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2022, 19 (14)
  • [46] How to promote the transition of fuel vehicle enterprises under dual credit policy? An improved tripartite evolutionary game analysis with time delay
    Zhao, Dan
    Wang, Jian
    Li, Ye-kai
    Tang, Jin-huan
    Zhang, Shui-wang
    ENERGY, 2024, 293
  • [47] Promotion Strategy of Policy against Food Waste (PAFW): The Perspective on Evolutionary Game between Local Government and Large Supermarkets
    Luo, Xichun
    Zhao, Honghao
    COMPLEXITY, 2021, 2021
  • [48] Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government-Enterprise-Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China
    Zou, Bilin
    Ju, Chunhua
    Bao, Fuguang
    Lai, Ye
    Xu, Chonghuan
    Zhu, Yiwen
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2022, 19 (08)
  • [49] Study on the diffusion of CCUS technology under carbon trading mechanism: Based on the perspective of tripartite evolutionary game among thermal power enterprises, government and public
    Liu, Pingkuo
    Wu, Jiahao
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2024, 438
  • [50] An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon technology investment strategies based on the manufacturer-supplier matching game under government regulations
    Liu, Li
    Wang, Zhe
    Li, Xintao
    Liu, Yingyan
    Zhang, Zaisheng
    ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH, 2022, 29 (29) : 44597 - 44617