Risk-taking incentives and risk-talking outcomes

被引:2
|
作者
Mishra, Dev R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Saskatchewan, Edwards Sch Business, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
关键词
CEO compensation; Executive options; Risk-taking incentives; Political risk; Earnings conference calls; MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; STOCK OPTION AWARDS; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; COMPENSATION; FIRM; DETERMINANTS; MANIPULATION; MANAGEMENT; PRICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.107080
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
CEOs' option-based compensation and discussions about political risk (risk-talking) in successive earnings conference calls are significantly positively associated. This effect is more significant in the subsample of firms with less equity price volatility and poor investment risk-taking (lower capital expenditure). Furthermore, seven out of eight components of risk-talking are positively related to CEOs' option-based compensation. These findings suggest that CEOs with more options in compensation packages are likely to find discussing political risk during corporate earnings calls as a viable alternative to boost proxies of risk-taking outcomes (such as equity price volatility), especially when they perceive risk-taking expectations to be untenable.
引用
收藏
页数:19
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