The Stabilizing Effects of Publishing Strategic Central Bank Projections

被引:3
|
作者
Ahrens, Steffen [1 ]
Lustenhouwer, Joep [2 ]
Tettamanzi, Michele [3 ]
机构
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Dept Econ, Boltzmann Str 20, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
[2] Heidelberg Univ, Bergheimer Str 58, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany
[3] REF Ric, Via Aurelio Saffi,12, I-20144 Milan, Italy
关键词
Learning-to-forecast experiment; central bank inflation projections; heterogeneous expectations; MONETARY-POLICY; LIQUIDITY TRAPS; KEYNESIAN MODEL; FEDERAL-RESERVE; EXPECTATIONS; DISAGREEMENT; FORECASTS; COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA;
D O I
10.1017/S1365100521000687
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Expectations are among the main driving forces for economic dynamics. Therefore, managing expectations has become a primary objective for monetary policy seeking to stabilize the business cycle. In this paper, we study whether central banks can manage private-sector expectations by means of publishing one-period ahead inflation projections in a New Keynesian learning-to-forecast experiment. Subjects in the experiment observe these projections along with the historic development of the economy and subsequently submit their own one-period ahead inflation forecasts. In this context, we find that the central bank can significantly manage private-sector expectations and that this management strongly supports monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. Moreover, published central bank inflation projections drastically reduce the probability of a deflationary spiral after strong negative shocks to the economy.
引用
收藏
页码:826 / 868
页数:43
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