Cooperative Game Theory Based Coordinated Scheduling of Two-Machine Flow-Shop and Transportation

A cooperative game theoretical approach is taken to production and transportation coordinated scheduling problems of two-machine flow-shop(TFS-PTCS problems) with an interstage transporter. The authors assume that there is an initial scheduling order for processing jobs on the machines.The cooperative sequencing game models associated with TFS-PTCS problems are established with jobs as players and the maximal cost savings of a coalition as its value. The properties of cooperative games under two different types of admissible rearrangements are analysed. For TFS-PTCS problems with identical processing time, it is proved that, the corresponding games are σ0-component additive and convex under one admissible rearrangement. The Shapley value gives a core allocation, and is provided in a computable form. Under the other admissible rearrangement, the games neither need to be σ0-component additive nor convex, and an allocation rule of modified Shapley value is designed.The properties of the cooperative games are analysed by a counterexample for general problems.