. The rise of multi-sided platforms, such as the Networked Collaborative Manufacturing Platform (NCMP), has enhanced connectivity and collaboration among stakeholders in the complex heavy equipment industry. However, the platform faces the challenge of deciding whether to provide highquality or low-quality services to meet diverse user needs. Designers and manufacturers must weigh the positive impacts, such as synergy benefit, against negative factors like service fee, potential loss, and knowledge loss when deciding whether to join the platform. This study investigates the strategies of the platform, designers, and manufacturers by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model. It proposes user acquisition strategies for platforms offering varying services quality levels. The findings indicate that: (1) setting appropriate service fees or commission is essential for achieving optimal cooperation between the platform and users; (2) when offering high-quality services, the platform should prioritize attracting manufacturers by enhancing synergy benefits, adjusting the distribution of these benefits, or increasing potential loss; (3) for low-quality services, users are less motivated to join, so the platform should focus on attracting designers who have lower requirements for synergy benefits or potential loss compared manufacturers; and (4) government subsidy can encourage platforms to offer high-quality services but may cause a "crowding-effect" and "deviation effect". However, if the platform effectively balances costs, pricing, and benefits for users, or it reaches maturity, government subsidy may become unnecessary.
