CEO Risk Taking Equity Incentives and Workplace Misconduct

被引:0
|
作者
Chircop, Justin [1 ]
Tarsalewska, Monika [2 ]
Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lancaster, Lancaster, England
[2] Univ Exeter, Exeter, England
[3] Univ York, York, England
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2025年 / 100卷 / 01期
关键词
workplace misconduct; executive compensation; risk taking; equity incentives; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; OPTION COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; STOCK-OPTIONS; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.2308/TAR-2020-0648
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relation between CEO risk taking equity incentives, as captured by CEO vega, and workplace misconduct. Workplace misconduct includes health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other violations broadly related to labor exploitation, and it results in significant economic costs. Using regression analysis, matched sample tests, and a quasi-natural experiment, we find a positive relation between CEO vega and workplace misconduct. We identify a reduction in discretionary expenses and increased employee workload as channels through which CEO vega affects workplace misconduct.
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页码:139 / 167
页数:29
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