Tie-Breaking Rule Based on Partial Proof of Work in a Blockchain

被引:0
|
作者
Sakurai, Akira [1 ]
Shudo, Kazuyuki [2 ]
机构
[1] Kyoto Univ, Grad Sch Informat, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
[2] Kyoto Univ, Acad Ctr Comp & Media Studies, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
来源
IEEE ACCESS | 2024年 / 12卷
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
Blockchain; tie-breaking rule; partial proof of work;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3521426
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In the area of blockchain, numerous methods have been proposed for suppressing intentional forks by attackers more effectively than the random rule. However, all of them, except for the random rule, require major updates such as hard forks or soft forks, rely on a trusted third party, or assume strong synchrony. Hence, it is challenging to apply these methods to existing systems such as Bitcoin. To address these issues, we propose another countermeasure that can be easily applied to existing proof of work blockchain systems. Our method is a tie-breaking rule that uses partial proof of work, which does not function as a block, as a time standard with finer granularity. By using the characteristic of partial proof of work, the proposed method enables miners to choose the last-generated block in a chain tie, which suppresses intentional forks by attackers. Only weak synchrony, which is already met by existing systems such as Bitcoin, is required for effective functioning. We evaluated the proposed method through detailed analyses that are lacking in existing works. In networks that adopt our method, the proportion of the attacker hashrate necessary for selfish mining was approximately 0.31479 or higher, which is remarkably close to the optimal value of 1/3, regardless of the block propagation capability of the attacker. Furthermore, we demonstrated through extended selfish mining that the impact of Match against pre-generated block, which is a concern in all last-generated rules, can be mitigated with appropriate parameter settings.
引用
收藏
页码:197999 / 198014
页数:16
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