We examine the relationship between returnee chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit fees in China using robust econometric modeling with 25,630 firm- year observations between 2008 and 2020. A returnee CEO is a Chinese CEO who has previously worked or studied outside mainland China. Consistent with the supply-side argument that returnees improve governance and reduce audit risk, having a returnee CEO is negatively associated with audit fees. This relationship is not sensitive to the source of foreign experience. Firms with (vs. without) returnee CEOs pay lower audit fees. This effect is particularly pronounced for state-owned enterprises. Poorly governed, highly complex and risky firms benefit most from returnee CEOs in terms of lower audit fees. Our findings are robust across various tests. (c) 2024 Sun Yat-sen University. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).