AQUINAS ON ANSWERING THE "IS IT ?". QUESTION ABOUT SINGULARS : WHAT THE 'IS' SIGNIFIES IN THE PROPOSITION "SOCRATES IS"

In this paper, I respond to the position of Lawrence Dewan and Stephen Brock that the answer to the question "Is it ?" is always made according to the sense of 'is' that signifies the truth of the composition of a proposition. Looking at Aquinas's semantic theory, I argue that one exception to this rule concerns the answer to the "Is it ?" question when asked of a singular substance such as Socrates. In this case, the 'is' in the proposition "Socrates is " signifies the actuality of Socrates rather than the truth of the proposition. In the course of this investigation, I clarify aspects of Aquinas semantic theory as regards his views on the copula and its signification.