Show, don't tell! The place of non-cognitive attitudes in moral discourse

According to expressivism, moral utterances express non-cognitive attitudes like approval or disapproval. However, [Woods, J. 2014. "Expressivism and Moores Paradox." Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-12] has presented a difficulty for expressivism. He argues that expressivism predicts that there are moral versions of Moore's paradox but in fact there aren't any. The present paper investigates what the relation between moral utterances and non-cognitive attitudes consists in if Woods's rebuttal of expressivism is correct and it is not the expression relation. It argues for a minimal account, according to which moral utterances only provide evidence for the speakers's non-cognitive attitudes. Such an account, the paper argues, explains Woods's observation while it avoids the pitfalls of its non-minimal competitors.