机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Stanford Univ, Ctr Democracy Dev & Rule Law, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USAStanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Schlapfer, Alain
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Ctr Democracy Dev & Rule Law, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Punishment of defectors is believed to be a key factor in sustaining cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, several studies have shown that humans also frequently punish those that act cooperatively, a phenomenon termed anti-social punishment. While subsequent work has suggested reasons why anti-social punishment may be individually optimal, it is universally considered to be detrimental to cooperation and thus indeed "anti-social". This study contradicts this view, showing that punishment of cooperators can be a positive factor in sustaining cooperation rates when used by conditional cooperators against those who cooperate unconditionally. This suggests that judging whether a punitive act is beneficial or detrimental to cooperation is more complex than previously thought.