Power, costs, collective action, bargaining, and solidarity

Some argue that the more costly it would be to exercise one's power over an issue, the less power one inherently has over it. I challenge this thesis with two major objections-one conceptual, the other practical or explanatory-contending that costs influence issue-power not inherently but contingently in specifically strategic contexts. Since agents' strategic dispositions are partly shaped by their perception of others' strategic incentives or dispositions, costs may affect-for better or worse!-one's bargaining power (in cases of conflict) or power to act in concert with others (in cases of shared preferences or aims). In many significant political contexts, greater costs increase actors' social power. Moreover, a group's collective power, and so its members' power-with, depend not only on the external cost structure, but also on opportunities for forging solidarity. The role of costs and solidarity explains why subjection to others can, paradoxically, sometimes increase one's power.