Carbon market and emission reduction: evidence from evolutionary game and machine learning

被引:0
|
作者
Zhan, Keyang [1 ]
Pu, Zhengning [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Southeast Univ, Nanjing, Peoples R China
来源
关键词
TRADING SCHEME; INTENSITY TARGETS; CHINA; LEAKAGE;
D O I
10.1057/s41599-025-04793-0
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The carbon market is a key tool for China to meet its emission reduction targets, but it is still in the early stages of development. More evidence is needed to assess its effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction between the government and enterprises and applies the Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT) algorithm to identify carbon emission reduction effects of the carbon market based on carbon emission data from 2000 to 2019. The theoretical model reveals that the construction of China's carbon market needs to go through three stages: stages of lack of enthusiasm from both the government and enterprises, government dominance, and market dominance. The empirical results show that the carbon market has a significant carbon emission reduction effect, which affects regional carbon emissions through technological innovation, fiscal, and digitalization effects. Further analysis indicates that the maturity of the carbon market and the readjustment of industrial structure contribute to carbon emission reduction effects. Although carbon emission reduction effects are not achieved by reducing labor employment, a resource curse effect may still emerge. This study deepens the understanding of China's carbon market construction and offers valuable insights for policy practices aimed at high-quality development.
引用
收藏
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Market incentives, carbon quota allocation and carbon emission reduction: Evidence from China's carbon trading pilot policy
    Shi, Beibei
    Li, Nan
    Gao, Qiang
    Li, Guangqin
    JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2022, 319
  • [22] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy
    Yu, Na
    Chen, Jianghua
    Cheng, Lei
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2022, 19 (14)
  • [23] Impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on carbon verification behavior: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory
    Wu, Xiaoping
    Liu, Peng
    Yang, Lin
    Shi, Zhuangfei
    Lao, Yongshuai
    ENERGY, 2024, 295
  • [24] GAME: GAlaxy Machine learning for Emission lines
    Ucci, G.
    Ferrara, A.
    Pallottini, A.
    Gallerani, S.
    MONTHLY NOTICES OF THE ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY, 2018, 477 (02) : 1484 - 1494
  • [25] Promoting Port Emission Reduction: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
    Yuan, Kebiao
    Wang, Xuefeng
    TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD, 2023, 2677 (05) : 1367 - 1386
  • [26] Momentum in machine learning: Evidence from the Taiwan stock market
    Bui, Dien Giau
    Kong, De-Rong
    Lin, Chih-Yung
    Lin, Tse-Chun
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 82
  • [27] The impact of green innovation on carbon reduction efficiency in China: Evidence from machine learning validation
    Zhao, Qiuyun
    Jiang, Mei
    Zhao, Zuoxiang
    Liu, Fan
    Zhou, Li
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2024, 133
  • [28] Carbon emission disclosure and carbon premium -- evidence from the Chinese bond market
    Si, Xiaohan
    Zhang, Shuai
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2025, 98
  • [29] Evolutionary Game and Strategy Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain Based on System Dynamic Model
    Guo, Wenqiang
    Chen, Siqi
    Lei, Ming
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (11)
  • [30] An analysis of optimal equilibrium in the carbon trading market - From a tripartite evolutionary game perspective
    Fan, Wen-Jing
    Fang, Yao
    Jiang, Rui-Bo
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2024, 96