Relational incentive contracts and double moral hazard in service outsourcing

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作者
Song, Han [1 ]
Dan, Bin [1 ]
Zhang, Xu-Mei [1 ]
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[1] School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
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25
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页码:1944 / 1953
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