Optimal assignment of principalship in cooperative R&D under incomplete information

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang, Changfeng [1 ]
Zhang, Peng [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Management Shandong, Jiaotong University, No. 5, Jiaoxiao Road, Tianqiao District, Jinan 250023, China
[2] School of Management, Shandong University, No. 27, Shanda South Road, Jinan 250100, China
来源：
ICIC Express Letters | 2011年 / 5卷 / 06期
关键词：
D O I：
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中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
This paper develops a general equilibrium model with two firms in cooperative R&D projects to investigate the optimal assignment of principalship under incomplete information. We make a distinction between cooperative R&D effort and monitoring effort. When it is costly to sign contracts on efforts under incomplete information, the optimal assignment of principalship in cooperative R&D depends on the interaction between each member's importance in cooperative R&D, the effectiveness of monitoring and the degree of R&D teamwork. © 2011 ISSN 1881-803X.
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页码：1975 / 1980
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