Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Rail-road Intermodal Transport System under Domination of Government

The operation of rail-road intermodal transportation is an energy-efficient transportation mode that is essentially developing in our country. From a systematic point of view, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between the government and road-rail transport companies. There exist 7 equilibrium points for the road-rail intermodal transportation system to satisfy the stability conditions through the game stability analysis. A numerical simulation is conducted to study the evolution of the ideal strategy set for its internal mechanism of each subject in the road-rail combined transport system. The evolution trend of the system is analyzed with the change of the initial strategic willingness of each subject. It is found that the evolution rate of highway and railway transportation companies toward cooperative strategies is not affected by the initial willingness, and the evolution rate is accelerated as the government actively promotes the strategic willingness. Finally, the influence of government behavior on the evolution of the game is analyzed. It is found that the increase in government subsidies, supervision, and the intensity of illegal supervision will speed up the evolution of highway and railway transportation companies towards cooperative strategies. The decline in the government's image is an important factor in promoting its active policy. Copyright © 2021 by Science Press.