Observer-based distributed cooperative control strategies for AC microgrids under false data injection attacks

In this paper, we focus on the false data injection (FDI) attack that violates the cooperative nature of AC (ac) microgrid distributed generators (DGs), resulting in an unstable dynamics of the system. In order to solve the above problems, we propose observer-based detection and resilient control strategy. Firstly, a commonly used AC microgrid model needs to be established, and an FDI attack independent of the data encrypted by the system needs to be designed based on the control structure of the microgrid, to illustrate the sufficient necessity of studying this attack. Then, based on the above system and attack model, an observer-based detection is designed in one part to observe the data at the attacked location and accurately differentiate between attacks and disturbances. An adaptive distributed resilience controller is designed in the other part to ensure that the frequency of the system can be kept in synchrony and recovered to the reference frequency under attack to curb system out-of-synchrony operation. Finally, the speed of convergence from the system frequency and the ability to recover to the reference frequency of the controller designed in this paper is verified by simulation comparison on a system with 4 DGs, which verifies that the control of the controller designed in this paper is better under different attacks.