Production cost information sharing strategies under various market competition

被引：0
|
作者：
Dai B. [1 ]
Pi Y. [1 ]
Li J. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan
[2] School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2017年 / 37卷 / 06期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Competition; Information sharing; Production cost; Strategy;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788(2017)06-1452-15
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two heterogeneous retailers with price competition and exogenous wholesale price, we study the production cost information sharing strategies from the manufacturer's perspective in terms of sharing with both, one or none retailers. We find that, if the truthful production cost is less than both production cost estimation of retailers, when the market competition is weak, sharing with both retailers is optimal, and otherwise, no sharing is optimal. However, when the truthful production cost is larger than one of the production cost estimation of retailers, the manufacturer's optimal production cost sharing strategies rely on both market competition and return cost. With the increasing of return cost, when the market competition is very intensive, the manufacturer prefers to share with production cost information, and otherwise, the manufacturer prefers to not share with production cost information. More importantly, we find the production cost sharing can improve the profit of all members in the supply chain under very intensive or intensive market competition. © 2017, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：1452 / 1466
页数：14
相关论文
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