Playing with commitments: Examples from the climate, ozone and air regimes

The objective of this article is to show that the 'bottom line' of the pollution reductions a country may be obliged to make when it accepts an international treaty can be much more slippery than is commonly believed. This is because a number of the constituents within agreements that make up the 'bottom line' can fundamentally alter what may, or may not, be included in such considerations. The result of this is that a much greater degree of latitude can be given to signatories than is commonly recognised, if the agreements utilise a number of considerations that are often overlooked. This overlooking is a mistake, as it is these considerations - the overall accounting framework for pollutants, the pollution potential given to the listed substances, and the requirements for reporting - that can have a dramatic impact on the commitments at issue. To demonstrate this point, I shall draw from the international regimes which deal with climate change, ozone depletion and air pollution. The object of this article is not to discuss the merits of adopting such tactics; rather, it is to draw to the attention of the practitioner in the field, considerations to be aware of.