Hierarchical game theory-based optimal power management for both seaports and ships

被引:0
|
作者
Wen, Shuli [1 ]
Dong, Zhixing [1 ]
Zhao, Tianyang [2 ]
Zhu, Miao [1 ]
Huang, Yuqing [3 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Key Lab Control Power Transmiss & Convers, Minist Educ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Marine Equipment Res Inst, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Seaport microgrid; Shipboard power system; Game theory; Leader-follower framework; Optimal power management; BERTH ALLOCATION; FORMULATIONS; GENERATION; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1016/j.energy.2024.133748
中图分类号
O414.1 [热力学];
学科分类号
摘要
Unlike land-based power systems, a seaport microgrid is not only equipped with extensive electrification but also connected with ships, which turns maritime power management into a comprehensive transportation-power coordination problem. To fully exploit the potential of shipboard power systems for energy efficiency improvement of seaports, a hierarchical Stackelberg game-based framework is developed in this paper to achieve efficient power management for both seaports and ships. In this framework, the seaport microgrid serves as a leader to manage the local sources and determine the price for ships to maximize revenue, considering the influence of both the power side and transportation side. On the other hand, the ships act as followers to decide the charging and service strategies for an optimal trade-off between the benefits from onboard battery charging and the ship service cost. The proposed game is solved as a bilevel optimization problem via mathematical programming with the equilibrium constraints method. The proposed algorithm's efficiency is evaluated through numerical simulations. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed power management method can simultaneously increase the economic profits of seaports and improve the service of ships at berth. Compared to traditional energy management methods, the comprehensive benefits can be increased by approximately 36 %.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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