Impact of carbon tax on green building development: An evolutionary game analysis

被引:1
|
作者
Zhao, Yu [1 ]
Gao, Gege [1 ]
Zhang, Jixiang [1 ]
Yu, Miao [1 ]
机构
[1] Shenyang Jianzhu Univ, Sch Management, Shenyang 110168, Peoples R China
关键词
Green building; Low-carbon development; Carbon tax; Stakeholder engagement; Evolutionary game analysis; CONSTRUCTION; SUBSIDY;
D O I
10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114401
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The green building supply side is pivotal for curbing carbon emissions in the construction industry and fostering green building development. This study, focusing on carbon tax, explores how different carbon tax policies influence stakeholder engagement in low-carbon development of green buildings. Using a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, suppliers, and developers, we analyze stakeholder behavior under varying carbon tax policies. A sensitivity analysis was conducted on the factors affecting the stability of the evolutionary system. The results indicate that the absence of government-implemented carbon tax policies hinders effective carbon emission reduction in the construction sector. Conversely, the implementation of carbon tax policies positively influences emission reductions, though their impact varies. Policy suggestions based on the findings include: 1. Gradually elevate carbon tax rates and expand their industry coverage to motivate highemission entities towards transformation. 2. Enhance public participation through subsidies, tax incentives, low-interest loans, and green financial tools. 3. Use penalties to drive corporate green transformation. 4. Phase out subsidies gradually to create a market-driven positive feedback loop. 5. Maintain education and awareness campaigns to foster sustainable public behavior.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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