Tripartite evolutionary game of green logistics development under carbon tax policy

The game balance of all actors is a key problem that needs to be solved in the development of green logistics. Based on the guidance of carbon tax policy, and considering the government, enterprises and third-party supervisors as stakeholders, this paper defined variables and parameters across seven aspects: basic cost, reputation fluctuation, reward subsidies, penalty losses, tax revenues, initial income and other support. This led to the creation of a tripartite game system for green logistics development. An income matrix was designed based on varying strategic combinations, and the expected income for each party was ascertained by its relationship with the strategy selection probability. By applying the Malthusian principle, a replicated dynamic equation of green logistics development under the carbon tax policy was established to analyze the game evolutionary rules of strategic behavior. The numerical analysis and system simulation reveal: (1) The behavior characteristics, individual responsibilities, and interest orientations of the tripartite game on the development of green logistics are clear, which is manifested as government guidance, enterprise implementation and third-party supervision; regulation, emission reduction and supervision; carbon tax, emission reduction subsidies and reporting incentives. (2) The government, enterprises and third-party supervisors all support the steady progression of green logistics, and their interest parameters positively affect the strategy combinations and choices of each subject. However, the effect is weaker on the third-party supervisors than on the government and enterprises. (3) Carbon tax, excess carbon emissions, emission reduction subsidies and reporting incentives are positive and effective for the development of green logistics, each parameter can support the strengthening supervision strategies of the government guiding party and complete the evolution to a steady state. It has a positive action on the strict emission reduction strategy to the logistics enterprises, where the carbon tax and excess carbon emissions are more effective and stable compared to the reporting incentives. It has a positive weak level to the strategy selection of the third-party supervisors, and the probability variable interval is limited. The research results can serve for the strategic behavior selection of the interest subjects of the green logistics under the carbon tax policy and support it high-quality development. © 2023, Central South University Press. All rights reserved.