Modeling optimal oil production paths under risk service contracts

被引:0
|
作者
Luo Dongkun
Zhao Xu
机构
[1] SchoolofBusinessAdministration,ChinaUniversityofPetroleum
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F416.22 [石油、天然气工业]; F224 [经济数学方法];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070104 ;
摘要
Due to the rigorous fiscal terms and huge potential risk of risk service contracts,optimizing oil production paths is one of the main challenges in designing oilfield development plans.In this paper,an oil production path optimization model is developed to maximize economic benefits within constraints of technology factors and oil contracts.This analysis describes the effects of risk service contract terms on parameters of inputs and outputs and quantifies the relationships between production and production time,revenues,investment and costs.An oil service development and production project is illustrated in which the optimal production path under its own geological conditions and contract terms is calculated.The influences of oil price,service fees per barrel and operating costs on the optimal production have been examined by sensitivity analysis.The results show that the oil price has the largest impact on the optimal production,which is negatively related to oil price and positively related to service fees per barrel and operating costs.
引用
收藏
页码:596 / 602
页数:7
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