Does mandating gender quota in corporate boards affect firms' credit ratings? Evidence from India

被引:0
|
作者
Muricken, Navya J. [1 ]
Bhagawan, Praveen [1 ]
Mukhopadhyay, Jyoti Prasad [2 ]
机构
[1] Krea Univ, Accounting & Finance Area, IFMR GSB, Sri City, India
[2] Krea Univ, Econ Area, IFMR GSB, Sri City, India
关键词
Gender quota; Quota reforms; Credit ratings; Female directors; FEMALE DIRECTORS; DIVERSITY; WOMEN; GOVERNANCE; RESPONSES; DEBT;
D O I
10.1108/JAL-04-2024-0070
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of compulsory presence of female members due to gender quota on corporate boards on firms' credit ratings.Design/methodology/approachWe investigate the impact of female directorial appointment on a firm's credit rating using firm-level panel data in a regression framework with industry- and year-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Further, to address endogeneity, we employ the difference-in-differences (DiD) technique by exploiting the changes in the corporate board composition induced by the exogeneous gender quota regulation. We also employ the Oster (2019) approach to test for omitted variable bias.FindingsIn this paper, we find that the firms that appoint female members on corporate boards post-gender quota mandate (treatment firms) enjoy improved credit ratings as compared to firms that had female members on corporate boards before the gender quota mandate (control group firms) became effective. The findings are robust to alternate definitions of credit rating, treatment and post variables.Originality/valueWe employ an alternative econometric technique, such as Oster's (2019) specification, to show that the involvement of female directors on corporate boards helps firms in improving firm's credit ratings. We also identify corporate risk measured using stock return volatility and cash flow volatility as the potential channels through which female directors' involvement on corporate boards leads to the improvement in firms' credit ratings.
引用
收藏
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Politically connected firms and access to credit: Evidence from India
    Hussain, Malik Altaf
    Tyagi, Malvika
    STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2024, 69 : 527 - 542
  • [42] Does corporate environmental responsibility (CER) affect corporate financial performance? Evidence from the global public construction firms
    Xu, Qian
    Lu, Yujie
    Lin, Han
    Li, Boying
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2021, 315
  • [43] Who becomes a politician in a gender quota system? Evidence from India
    Mori, Yuko
    Manjula, R.
    Rajasekhar, D.
    Goto, Jun
    Kurosaki, Takashi
    WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 2025, 188
  • [44] Insiders' stock pledging disclosures and credit ratings: Evidence from India
    Singh, Amanjot
    Singh, Harminder
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2022, 75
  • [45] Mandatory CSR expenditure regulation and credit ratings: Evidence from India
    Yadav, Neetu
    Kumar, Satish
    FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, 2025, 75
  • [46] How does corporate ESG performance affect bond credit spreads: Empirical evidence from China
    Lian, Yonghui
    Ye, Tao
    Zhang, Yiyang
    Zhang, Lin
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2023, 85 : 352 - 371
  • [47] Credit ratings and corporate risk-taking behavior: evidence from Korea
    Hong, Seiwoong
    Kim, Wonkyun
    Lee, Junyong
    Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl
    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2023, 30 (16) : 2200 - 2207
  • [48] The Real Effects of Financial Statement Recognition: Evidence from Corporate Credit Ratings
    Basu, Riddha
    Naughton, James P.
    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2020, 66 (04) : 1672 - 1691
  • [49] The impact of credit ratings on corporate behavior: Evidence from Moody's adjustments
    Kisgen, Darren J.
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2019, 58 : 567 - 582
  • [50] Do Firms Manage Earnings to Influence Credit Ratings? Evidence from Negative Credit Watch Resolutions
    Liu, Alfred Zhu
    Subramanyam, K. R.
    Zhang, Jieying
    Shi, Charles
    ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2018, 93 (03): : 267 - 298