Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India

被引：0
|
作者：
Afridi, Farzana [1 ,2 ]
Bhattacharya, Sourav [3 ]
Dhillon, Amrita [4 ,5 ]
Solan, Eilon [6 ]
机构：
[1] Indian Stat Inst Delhi, Econ & Planning Unit, Delhi, India
[2] IZA, Dortmund, Germany
[3] Indian Inst Management Calcutta, Kolkata, India
[4] Kings Coll London, London, England
[5] Univ Warwick, CAGE, Coventry, England
[6] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Math Sci, Tel Aviv, Israel
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2024年 / 227卷
基金：
以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
Corruption; Electoral competition; Uncertainty; Audit; Accountability; AUDITS; ACCOUNTABILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.018
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.
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页数：16
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