How does the supervision effect affect the firm's performance in Taiwanese stock market?

被引：0
|
作者：
Hsieh, Tsung-Yu [1 ]
Lin, Tsai-Yin [2 ]
Li, Fangjhy [3 ]
Tien, Chih-Yun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Zhaoqing Univ, Econ & Management Coll, Dept Econ, Zhaoqing, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Kaohsiung Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Finance, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
[3] Hubei Univ Econ, Sch Finance, Dept Finance, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China
来源：
PLOS ONE | 2024年 / 19卷 / 09期
关键词：
DIRECTORS; BOARD; ALGORITHMS; OWNERSHIP; NUMBER; PAY;
D O I：
10.1371/journal.pone.0307988
中图分类号：
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号：
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要：
This paper explores the impact of the CEO's supervisory role as an independent director on firm performance, utilizing measures such as Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q. The supervisory effect is assessed through the remuneration of directors and supervisors. Empirical findings indicate a significant supervisory role when the CEO also serves as an independent director. Whether viewed from the perspective of shareholders' equity or company growth, the CEO's involvement as an independent director positively influences firm performance. Furthermore, the concurrent roles of CEO and independent director contribute to enhanced firm performance, irrespective of their relationship.
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页数：9
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