MAJORITY RULES

被引:0
|
作者
Verstein, Andrew [1 ]
机构
[1] UCLA Sch Law, Law, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS; DERIVATIVE SUIT; CORPORATE-LAW; LITIGATION; CONFLICT; BOARD;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The "disinterested and independent majority" is one of the most important concepts in corporate law. Corporate actions are almost immune to legal challenge if a suitable majority of directors stands ready to approve it. Scholars have extensively debated the proper meaning and effect of "disinterested and independent," but no such literature analyzes "majority." As a matter of arithmetic, how do we compute whether a given set of directors contains a suitable majority? While seemingly innocuous, the concept of a majority means different things to different courts. Indeed, there may be no majority rule for majority independence. The Article charts and analyzes a puzzle somehow undiscovered, though at the heart of a field. In so doing, it asks questions important to debates far afield of corporate law. Majority rules matter for flawed democracies everywhere.
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页码:317 / 376
页数:60
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