Institution or Individuality? Some Reflections on the Lessons To Be Learned From Personal Accounts of Recovery

In this paper, I argue for a social conception of subjectivity, via a philosophical reading of first -person accounts of recovery from schizophrenia, published in the Schizophrenia Bulletin . Following the hypothesis that these accounts exemplify a more general tension between, on the one hand, normative and social dimensions of the self, and on the other, experiential and psychological dimensions, the first section of the paper formulates the problem from a philosophical perspective inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's grammatical approach. The second section explores and rejects different possible readings (sociologistic, phenomenological, or narrativist readings), as conceiving the subject in too passive a relationship with him or herself, and as leading to overly skeptical conclusions about the claims in the first -person accounts insisting on the notion of recovery as a restoration of a sense of self and as empowerment. The third section suggests that a more positive answer can be given via the idea of a certain grammar of recovery governing these narratives, and sketches out how this relates to the more general philosophical question on subjectivity.