Holding cash for corruption? Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign

被引:0
|
作者
Chen, Yulin [1 ]
Wang, Changyun [2 ]
Yi, Yang [3 ]
Zeng, Jianyu [4 ]
机构
[1] Capital Univ Econ & Business, Coll Business Adm, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Rochester, Simon Business Sch, Rochester, NY USA
[4] ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management, Res Dept, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2025年 / 65卷 / 01期
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Anti-corruption; corporate cash holdings; liquidity hypothesis; POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP; AGENCY COSTS; FIRMS HOLD; CONNECTIONS; SENSITIVITY; INVESTMENT; AUDITS;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.13341
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Exploiting China's anti-corruption campaign in 2012 as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that firms with higher prior entertainment and travel costs (ETC), a proxy for corruption, decrease cash holdings more because of the campaign. We further observe a greater decline in cash values for more corrupt firms. Moreover, the baseline pattern is more pronounced in financially constrained, better-governed, and private enterprises. We also rule out possible confounders concerning firms' financing conditions and investment decisions. Overall, the evidence favours the liquidity hypothesis that firms demand less cash as they anticipate fewer corrupt opportunities in the business environment in the post-campaign era.
引用
收藏
页码:581 / 619
页数:39
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