Financial Stability Governance and Central Bank Communications

被引:0
|
作者
Londono, Juan M. [1 ]
Claessens, Stijn [2 ]
Correa, Ricardo [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Board, 2051 Constitut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20418 USA
[2] Bank Int Settlements, Basel, Switzerland
来源
关键词
INDEPENDENCE; FORECASTS; MINUTES; POLICY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate how central banks' financial stability governance frameworks influence their financial stability communication strategies and their effectiveness in preventing financial stress. Using data for 24 central banks, we test how communication strategies and their effectiveness depend on the powers assigned to these institutions. We find robust evidence that communications by central banks represented in interagency financial stability committees with more powers are more effective in mitigating a deterioration in financial conditions. These central banks also use macroprudential tools more consistently with their communications and, after conditions deteriorate, transmit a calmer message, suggesting that the ability to use macroprudential tools strengthens incentives not to just "cry wolf."
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页码:175 / 220
页数:46
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