Inference to the best neuroscientific explanation

Neuroscientists routinely use reverse inference (RI) to draw conclusions about cognitive processes from neural activation data. However, despite its widespread use, the methodological status of RI is a matter of ongoing controversy, with some critics arguing that it should be rejected wholesale on the grounds that it instantiates a deductively invalid argument form. In response to these critiques, some have proposed to conceive of RI as a form of abduction or inference to the best explanation (IBE). We side with this response but at the same time argue that a defense of RI requires more than identifying it as a form of IBE. In this paper, we give an analysis of what determines the quality of an RI conceived as an IBE and on that basis argue that whether an RI is warranted needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Support for our argument will come from a detailed methodological discussion of RI in cognitive neuroscience in light of what the recent literature on IBE has identified as the main quality indicators for IBEs.