Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

被引：2
|
作者：
Yan, Yuyue [1 ]
Hayakawa, Tomohisa [1 ]
机构：
[1] Tokyo Inst Technol, Dept Syst & Control Engn, Tokyo 1528552, Japan
来源：
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL | 2024年 / 69卷 / 07期
关键词：
Nash equilibrium; Finance; Games; Behavioral sciences; Government; Sensitivity; Dynamical systems; Gradient play; incentive mechanism; noncooperative systems; Pareto improvement; Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium; potentialization; sustainable budget constraint; NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING; BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS; POWER-CONTROL; PUBLIC-GOODS; GAME; IMPLEMENTATION; CONVERGENCE; NETWORKS; PRIVATE; TOLLS;
D O I：
10.1109/TAC.2023.3325412
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
A Pareto-improving incentive mechanism to improve the weighted social welfare and achieve continual Pareto improvement for a pseudogradient-based noncooperative dynamical system is developed. In the proposed approach, the system manager remodels agents' dynamical decision-making by collecting taxes from some agents and giving some of the collected taxes to other agents as subsidies with a sustainable budget constraint. Sufficient conditions are derived under which agents' state converges toward the socially maximum state associated with a weighted social welfare function depending on the priority ratio of the agents and the initial state. We present several illustrative numerical examples to illustrate the efficacy of our results and reveal the fact that the potentialization of the payoff structure has a very strong relation to generating Pareto-improving system trajectories.
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页码：4291 / 4306
页数：16
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