Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder Behavioral Strategies in the Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Industry through an Evolutionary Game Theory

被引:1
|
作者
Wang, Yanyan [1 ]
Qi, Lijun [1 ]
Cui, Wenjing [1 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Jianzhu Univ, Sch Management Engn, Jinan 250101, Peoples R China
关键词
construction and demolition waste; recycling products; stakeholder; evolutionary game theory; SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.3390/buildings14051425
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Construction and demolition waste (C&DW) recycling products have drawn worldwide attention over the past few decades. There is a general agreement among researchers that C&DW recycling is an important means for curbing the deterioration of the environment. Previous papers mainly focused on the decision-making behavior of dual stakeholders or tripartite stakeholders, as well as the lack of cooperation among multiple stakeholders. This study explored a dynamic evolutionary game model with three different parameter conditions to research the decision-making behaviors and stable strategies of the multi-stakeholders involved in the C&DW recycling product industry, including government departments and some enterprises. This research also investigated how the government's supervision costs, penalties applied to enterprises, and resource taxes affect the dynamic evolution process of C&DW recycling. This research conducted numerical simulations using Python to analyze stakeholders' behavioral evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and the sensitivity to main factors in each stage of the C&DW recycling process to accelerate the development of construction waste resource utilization. Based on the results of the evolutionary game, this paper proposed that the roles of multi-stakeholders are different at different stages of industry development, and that supervision costs, penalties, and resource tax have their own impacts on the C&DW recycling product industry. The paper suggests a range of discussions and simulation studies to highlight the significance of the government's refined and moderate adjustments to the regulatory incentive system and the level of government regulation and involvement at different stages of the process. These adjustments are aimed at promoting the sustainable recycling and utilization of construction and demolition waste (C&DW) products within some countries' construction industry.
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页数:19
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