Block-Coordinate Methods and Restarting for Solving Extensive-Form Games

被引:0
|
作者
Chakrabarti, Darshan [1 ]
Diakonikolas, Jelena [2 ]
Kroer, Christian [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, IEOR Dept, New York, NY 10025 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin Madison, Dept Comp Sci, Madison, WI 53706 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
VARIATIONAL-INEQUALITIES; CONVERGENCE;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Coordinate descent methods are popular in machine learning and optimization for their simple sparse updates and excellent practical performance. In the context of large-scale sequential game solving, these same properties would be attractive, but until now no such methods were known, because the strategy spaces do not satisfy the typical separable block structure exploited by such methods. We present the first cyclic coordinate-descent-like method for the polytope of sequence-form strategies, which form the strategy spaces for the players in an extensive-form game (EFG). Our method exploits the recursive structure of the proximal update induced by what are known as dilated regularizers, in order to allow for a pseudo block-wise update. We show that our method enjoys a O(1/T) convergence rate to a two-player zero-sum Nash equilibrium, while avoiding the worst-case polynomial scaling with the number of blocks common to cyclic methods. We empirically show that our algorithm usually performs better than other state-of-the-art first-order methods (i.e., mirror prox), and occasionally can even beat CFR+, a state-of-the-art algorithm for numerical equilibrium computation in zero-sum EFGs. We then introduce a restarting heuristic for EFG solving. We show empirically that restarting can lead to speedups, sometimes huge, both for our cyclic method, as well as for existing methods such as mirror prox and predictive CFR+.
引用
收藏
页数:29
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
    Pahl, Lucas
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2023, 141 : 444 - 471
  • [22] Discretization of Continuous Action Spaces in Extensive-Form Games
    Kroer, Christian
    Sandholm, Tuomas
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (AAMAS'15), 2015, : 47 - 56
  • [23] Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
    Heifetz, Aviad
    Meier, Martin
    Schipper, Burkhard C.
    B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2021, 21 (02): : 525 - 556
  • [24] XDO: A Double Oracle Algorithm for Extensive-Form Games
    McAleer, Stephen
    Lanier, John
    Wang, Kevin A.
    Baldi, Pierre
    Fox, Roy
    ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 34 (NEURIPS 2021), 2021,
  • [25] SET-THEORETIC EQUIVALENCE OF EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES
    BONANNO, G
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1992, 20 (04) : 429 - 447
  • [26] Computing Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games
    Cerny, Jakub
    Lisy, Viliam
    Bosansky, Branislav
    An, Bo
    THIRTY-FIFTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2021, 35 : 5260 - 5268
  • [27] Last-iterate Convergence in Extensive-Form Games
    Lee, Chung-Wei
    Kroer, Christian
    Luo, Haipeng
    ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 34 (NEURIPS 2021), 2021, 34
  • [28] Computational Results for Extensive-Form Adversarial Team Games
    Celli, Andrea
    Gatti, Nicola
    THIRTY-SECOND AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTIETH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / EIGHTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2018, : 965 - 972
  • [29] Fictitious Self-Play in Extensive-Form Games
    Heinrich, Johannes
    Lanctot, Marc
    Silver, David
    INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING, VOL 37, 2015, 37 : 805 - 813
  • [30] Converting MA-PDDL to Extensive-Form Games
    Kovacs, Daniel L.
    Dobrowiecki, Tadeusz P.
    ACTA POLYTECHNICA HUNGARICA, 2013, 10 (08) : 27 - 47