The Algorithmic Assignment of Incentive Schemes

被引:0
|
作者
Opitz, Saskia [1 ,2 ]
Sliwka, Dirk [1 ]
Vogelsang, Timo [3 ]
Zimmermann, Tom [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Fac Management Econ & Social Sci, Dept Corp Dev, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[2] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[3] Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management, Dept Accounting, D-60322 Frankfurt, Germany
[4] Univ Cologne, Fac Management Econ & Social Sci, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
关键词
randomized controlled trial; incentives; heterogeneity; treatment effects; selection; algorithm; machine learning; PERFORMANCE PAY; PERSONALITY-TRAITS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; BIG; 5; COMPENSATION; PRODUCTIVITY; PREFERENCES; AVERSION; ONLINE;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2022.03362
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments is a central question in designing optimal policies. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance via targeted incentives using machine learning algorithms with worker demographics, personality traits, and preferences as input. Running two large-scale experiments, we show that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured worker characteristics, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect heterogeneity in responses to different schemes, (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individuals increases performance significantly above the level of the single best scheme, and (iv) algorithmic assignment is more effective for workers who have a high likelihood to repeatedly interact with the employer or who provide more consistent survey answers.
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页数:19
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