Evolutionary analysis of nuclear wastewater collaborative governance based on prospect theory

Dealing nuclear wastewater into the sea significantly threatens the global ecological environment and public health. Existing research primarily focuses on the roles of emission and regulatory bodies, often overlooking the collaborative interactions between these entities. This study extends traditional marine governance strategies by considering upstream and downstream countries as research subjects. We first establish an evolutionary game model for the collaborative governance of nuclear wastewater between upstream and downstream countries, utilizing the Prospect theory and Evolutionary Game Theory. Subsequently, numerical simulations are employed to explore different entities' decision-making behaviors and influencing factors. Our findings indicate that: (1) initial willingness affects the time it takes for the system to reach a stable state; (2) the benefits and costs of proactive governance strategies influence decision-maker's behaviors; (3) subjective factors (risk preference, loss aversion) affect the strategic choices. This research provides a scientific basis for understanding different countries' selection of nuclear wastewater governance strategies.