Feedback Nash Equilibria for Scalar Two-Player Linear-Quadratic Discrete-Time Dynamic Games

被引:1
|
作者
Nortmann, Benita [1 ]
Monti, Andrea [2 ]
Sassano, Mario [2 ]
Mylvaganam, Thulasi [1 ]
机构
[1] Imperial Coll London, Dept Aeronaut, London SW7 2AZ, England
[2] Univ Roma Tor Vegata, Dipartimento Ingn Civile & Ingn Informat DICII, Via Politecn 1, I-00133 Rome, Italy
来源
IFAC PAPERSONLINE | 2023年 / 56卷 / 02期
关键词
Dynamic games; Nash equilibrium strategies; Linear systems;
D O I
10.1016/j.ifacol.2023.10.1888
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In this paper, we consider discrete-time, scalar, two-player, linear-quadratic dynamic games and study the coupled algebraic equations characterising feedback Nash equilibria. Using geometric arguments, we first analyse the possible number of distinct feedback Nash equilibrium solutions a game may admit and discuss properties of different solutions, before deriving conditions for the existence of no, one, two or three distinct feedback Nash equilibria. Finally, illustrative numerical simulations corroborate the theoretical findings. Copyright (c) 2023 The Authors. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
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收藏
页码:1772 / 1777
页数:6
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