Models of Wages and Mobility in Frictional Labor Markets with Random Search

被引：0
|
作者：
Lentz, Rasmus [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Univ Aarhus, Dale T Mortensen Ctr, Aarhus, Denmark
来源：
REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 2024年 / 75卷 / 01期
关键词：
wage determination; employment and job mobility; labor market friction; employment contracts; THE-JOB SEARCH; DISPERSION; WORKERS;
D O I：
10.3917/reco.751.0113
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I survey frictional labor market models of equilibrium wage determination and mobility. Search is random. Competition between firms is in terms of value promises to workers. The exact nature of the competition dictates the distribution of value promises in the economy. Worker mobility and allocation to jobs are often understood directly from this part of the model. The survey details how employment contract design restrictions map contract values into wages.
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页码：113 / 145
页数：33
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