We analyze the political impact of a generous solar panel subsidization program. Subsidies far exceeded their social benefit and were partly financed by new taxes on adopters and by electricity surcharges for all consumers. We use local panel data from Belgium and find a decrease in votes for government parties in municipalities with high adoption rates. This shows that the voters' punishment for a costly policy exceeded the potential reward by adopters who received generous subsidies. Further analysis indicates that punishment mainly comes from non -adopters, who change their vote towards anti-establishment parties.
机构:
UMR CNRS 8568, CIRED, 45 Bis Ave Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent Sur Marne, FranceUMR CNRS 8568, CIRED, 45 Bis Ave Belle Gabrielle, F-94736 Nogent Sur Marne, France
机构:
Middlebury Coll, Middlebury, VT USAMiddlebury Coll, Middlebury, VT USA
Gregg, Amanda
Nafziger, Steven
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机构:
Williams Coll, Williamstown, MA USA
Williams Coll, Dept Econ, Schapiro Hall,24 Hopkins Hall Dr, Williamstown, MA 01267 USAMiddlebury Coll, Middlebury, VT USA