Stochastic differential game of joint emission reduction in the supply chain based on CSR and carbon cap-and-trade mechanism

被引:9
|
作者
Wang, Ke [1 ]
Wu, Panyu [1 ]
Zhang, Weihai [2 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Zhongtai Secur Inst Financial Studies, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
[2] Shandong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Elect Engn & Automat, Qingdao 266590, Peoples R China
关键词
Carbon cap-and-trade mechanism; Corporate social responsibility; Stochastic differential game; Joint emission reduction; COORDINATION; DECISION; INVESTMENT; QUALITY; POLICY; PRICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfranklin.2024.106719
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper considers both carbon emission reduction and corporate social responsibility (CSR) goodwill as endogenous variables in the joint emission reduction process of the supply chain system. The joint emission reduction strategy of the three-tier supply chain system is examined from a long-term perspective utilizing stochastic differential game models. Three models, namely the cooperative game, the Nash non -cooperative game, and the Stackelberg master-slave game, are developed to analyse and compare the equilibrium strategies under each model. The results indicate that the manufacturer -led Stackelberg master-slave game can achieve the Pareto improvement in the profits of the supplier, manufacturer, retailer, and the entire supply chain system.
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页数:20
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